

1. Carefully define a competitive equilibrium for this economy. Characterize it using the agents' first-order conditions. Is the economy Pareto-optimal? (15)
2. State the Social Planner's problem, and derive the first-order conditions. (15)
3. Do households work more, fewer, or just the same number of hours in the competitive equilibrium compared to the Planner's solution? (15)
4. Now assume that $u(c) = \log c$, $v(l) = 2l^2$, and that $k = \frac{1}{4}$ and $A = 2$. The government considers introducing a tax τ_L on the households' labor income (which can be a subsidy if $\tau_L < 0$). The government redistributes the tax revenue through a lump-sum transfer on households T (again possibly negative). Can the government implement the allocation from the Planner's solution? If yes, what level of τ_L should be chosen? (15)