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paradoxically withheld information about the war and indeed fostered alternative

In his *Les Travaux de L'Annee Sociologique* (1925), historian and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs conceptualized collective memory in one of the most lasting analogies of his illustrious scholarly career. He likened collective memory to pools upon a rocky shore, left behind by the retreating "tide of living memory." The ocean, Halbwachs explained, is representative of the memories of those who experienced or witnessed an historical event. Thus when this tide ebbs, what is left are pools of memory that, however tranquil, are incomplete. Furthermore, the rocks surrounding these pools serve as the political and social molds that contain and shape these resultant memories. Through metaphor, Halbwachs encapsulated what are among the fundamental problems confronting the theory of collective memory, and, more important to this study, its relation to history. The most obvious issue at hand is memory's resemblance to history. The theoretical danger in making history and memory synonymous is well documented, by historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists alike. Wulf Kansteiner, in his study on postwar remembrances of the Holocaust in Germany, summarizes the dilemma scholars face when conceptualizing collective memory within the context of history: Collective memory is not history, though it is sometimes made from similar material. It is a collective phenomenon, but it only manifests itself in the actions and statements of individuals. It can take hold of historically and socially remote events but often privileges the interests of the contemporary. It is as much a result of conscious manipulation as unconscious absorption.

Because history and collective memory are "made from similar material," and because each makes meaningful contributions to the other, both concepts are consequently malleable to the point they can be made unrecognizable from one another. For this reason, historians must deliver caveats to their readers when engaging in formative studies on a particular historical period, event, or the remembrances thereof. Marc Gallicchio acknowledges that "memory is a reconstruction of the past, not a reproduction;" Yoshikuni Igarashi warns that "the past is signified and forgotten through the mediation of history;" and T. Fujitani claims that the past "is divorced from our own time and location waiting to be interpreted."

The problem of history's (and collective memory's) corruptibility is exacerbated by the absorption of these altered narratives by societies living under the aegis of those making the histories. Why there is such little resistance by people exposed to politically modified histories is a topic for debate, but most scholars seem to agree that "in creating collective memories, societies are not bound by the same rules of evidence that discipline historians." Kansteiner identifies "a troubling disregard for proof" as a cause for the seemingly indiscriminate acceptance of historical representations among

societies. What results from such a combination of historical manipulation and unchecked absorption might resemble the dystopian picture painted by George Orwell in his famous novel 1984, where the State reveled in the blind adherence to the myth-histories it propagated. The occupation of Japan had just begun to ease its restrictions on Japanese media outlets and allow for open communication about the war in 1949, the same year Orwell's novel was published. The formal occupation of Japan, which would continue for another three years was likely the most cogent example of what Orwell had warned the world of.

Rewriting History: The Scope

In attempting to foster a pacifist, democratic government and national body in Japan, the occupation commenced the greatest reorganization of educational

occupation texts was limited (as opposed to the volume of these texts published, which according to MacArthur reached over 250 million copies) . This served to standardize education throughout the archipelago. Nuance was hard to come by in these official narratives—each decried Japan’s past aggression and exalted American customs, values, and institutions, especially democracy. The “peace education” introduced by the occupation became omnipresent and seemingly irreversible until the occupation ended April 1952.

The reach and magnitude of the occupation’s commission and omission of history resulted in part from the sheer force dedicated to the reformation of postwar Japan. The Civil Information and Education Section, which oversaw the “blackening-over” of textbooks and the dissemination of democratic propaganda and philosophies, employed 563 people, most of whom were American-trained Japanese who served as translators, editors, and researchers. From October 1945 until the end of the occupation, the CI&E Section underwent three distinct reorganizations, which added and shifted its divisions to more comprehensively monitor information sharing in Japan. The CI&E Section’s jurisdiction ranged from “Education and Religions,” “Press and Publications,” and “Radio,” to “Motion Picture,” “Arts and Monuments,” and “Theater.”

The more notorious Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) was even larger. By 1947, it employed over six thousand people, again the majority of whom were English-speaking Japanese . The CCD’s prepublication censorship of books, magazines, newspapers, movies, and even Kabuki plays was the base from which popular discourse on Hirohito’s war responsibility and the effects of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were effectively extracted, and thus quieted. In September 1949, the occupation secretly dissolved the CCD, but by then the latter had confiscated and read hundreds of millions of private letters and monitored nearly 100,000 private phone conversations. The professions and social statuses of people that had their mail read and phones tapped varied greatly, but censors largely focused on former military personnel, ensuring that ex-soldiers and navy men were not plotting against the occupation. Among the groups monitored was the infamous Unit 731, the Imperial Army section which had conducted biological warfare experiments on nearly 10,000 people,

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1946 proof of the English-language Nippon Times which called MacArthur “the Savior,” Chief of Intelligence Charles A. Willoughby, organized a squad of [policemen], descended on the printing plant, where presses were rolling off the last of an edition of 50,000. He ordered the presses stopped. Trains were held up until the papers already loaded could be removed. When the last of the copies of the offending editorial had been burned the Nippon Times went to press again. The CCD’s censorship policies may have been oversensitive, but they were equally as effective. By removing discourse counterproductive to the social, economic, and political goals of the occupation, the CCD streamlined the histories of the war being discussed in Japan. The narratives that were most tampered with included the issue of Hirohito’s responsibility for the war, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even the naming of the war proved consequential enough for alteration.

Memory of the “Pacific War

Following Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, initial Japanese reactions to and remembrances of the war were mixed. Many Japanese felt despair, fearing that their way of life was to be compromised by the victorious United States. Others felt anger because by accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the emperor had let them down. Still others were disappointed that their leaders had taken the country to war in the first place. The notion of guilt was equally as uncertain. When asked whether or not he thought the Japanese were repentant, Manfred Gottfried, TIME magazine’s Chief Pacific Correspondent, replied: “No. And neither are they unrepentant. They [feel] oppressed by their own military clique and are pleased because we have freed them from that oppression.” Gottfried’s last point was representative of the occupation’s view of the war in general—that just as Japan viewed itself as rescuing South and East-Asia from the insatiable hunger of Western imperialism, the United States viewed its role in the war as being the protector of democratic principles and the rule of law. Part of this

magnitude and violence meant the loss of many more American lives, ones that they had claimed to have been saved by the dropping of atomic bombs on Japanese cities. U.S. Army Officer and former director of psychological warfare, Bonner Fellers, mirrored the sentiment felt by Hidejia, and reflected the desires of the Occupation and its commander in chief: "...it is extremely disadvantageous to MacArthur's standing in the United States to put on trial the very emperor who is cooperating with him and facilitating the smooth administration of the occupation."

For the Americans, a peaceful occupation meant the successful conduct of economic relations as well. As Manfred Gottfried phrased it in November 1945 when asked if the occupation's reform of Japanese society was "retarded by keeping the emperor":
Not if you mean reform. We had the choice of rebuilding or remodeling. We chose the latter....Remodeling has two advantages: it is quicker and cheaper. New social institutions cannot be created in one year or five. Old institutions can be modified sooner. Furthermore, by using the imperial institution as our tool we are using Japanese resources in the political field, much as we use Japanese resources rather than our own to accomplish our economic ends in Japan.

For the Japanese, absolving Hirohito of responsibility implied forgiveness of all Japanese people, since they had fought and supported the war for his honor and in his name. In what T. Fujitani has called "The Foundational Narrative" of postwar Japan as propagated by the occupation, civilian understanding of the war was based on the notion that Hirohito had been "ahistorical," "apolitical," and militarily hapless during the

"victims" of the militarists' propaganda and unilateral decision-making.

Emperor as a war criminal.” MacArthur knew full well the advantages of keeping Hirohito safe from international trial and public admonishment. In his *Reminiscences*, MacArthur recalled:

“I believed that if the Emperor were indicted, and perhaps hanged, as a war criminal, military government would have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guerilla warfare would probably break out,” and that “...I would need at least one million reinforcements should such action be taken.”

The narrative that emerged in response to these concerns in turn made Hirohito into the savior of the Japanese people from the horrors of war. In America, the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been framed by the fateful decision of Harry Truman. Rather than affording the Japanese any condolence by acknowledging the human tribulations they suffered and the medical problems that resulted from the bombs' radiation, the American narrative focused on the personal struggle Truman confronted in choosing to pull the trigger. The Truman-centered narrative that was being disseminated in the United States had relevance for Hirohito in Japan as well. During the occupation, Truman's decision was balanced by the “sacred decision” by Emperor Hirohito to end the war following the second bombing. During a deadlock of the Supreme War Leadership Council on the night of August 9-10, Hirohito decided to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, with the singular demand that the Imperial system be upheld. Hirohito's “sacred decision” came despite requests by his war minister and his two chiefs of staff to add to the stipulations of the surrender: to limit the forces of occupation, to allow Japan to try its own war criminals, and to leave disarmament to Japan as well. Just as Truman's decision to drop the bombs was viewed in America as saving “thousands and thousands of American lives,” Hirohito's intervention during the council was viewed, by the occupation and Japanese civilians alike, as having saved not only the Japanese people, but the human race from nuclear devastation and destruction. During his national radio address to the Japanese people

example. During the previous European conflict, he wrote the following poem: 'I thought the world's ocean were brothers;/why the tumult of roaring wind and waves.'

The Japanese government, under the auspices of the occupation, released statements confirming Hirohito's innocence during the war. A November 5th resolution strictly defined the war and Hirohito's role in its commencement from a Japanese perspective:

1. The Japanese Empire could not help but start the Great East Asian War, given the surrounding circumstances;
2. The Emperor wished to see the American negotiations reach a peaceful compromise;
3. In accordance with the established precedents in observing the Constitution, the emperor never rejected the decision of the imperial government and the Imperial General Headquarters to circumstances;

Books concerning the bomb also came under the hammer of censorship during the occupation. Arguably the best English-language account of the bombings was John Hersey's *Hiroshima*, published in August 1946 by *The New Yorker*. For its grotesque images of bomb victims, and for its introspective analysis into the human suffering inflicted by Americans, Hersey's work was not published in translation until 1949, when formal restrictions on media about the bomb were finally lifted. The early works of Nagai Takashi, intense, personal writings on the pain and affliction suffered by women and children close to him were suppressed until late 1948. Even after the publication of his *Nagasaki no Kane* (*The Bells of Nagasaki*), censorship officials demanded inclusion of an appendix about the "Sack of Manila" by the Japanese Army. Masako Ishida's now famous *Masako taorezu* (*Masako does not collapse*) was censored in 1947 because it was deemed a threat to "public tranquility," and that it "implied that the bombing was a crime against humanity."

Visual records of the bombs and their effects were also subject to censorship, confiscation, and even destruction. A team of documentary filmmakers had hundreds of feet of footage (filmed during almost five months of work in the toxic streets of Hiroshima) confiscated by occupation authorities and sent to America to be kept from being reproduced. In November 1945, SCAP ordered the destruction of over 200 films deemed militaristic, critical of the occupation, or both. In another of the period's glaring ironies, Kurosawa Akira's *Tora no o o fumu otokotachi* (*They Who Step on the Tiger's Tail*) was censored by the Japanese government for being too democratic, and then subsequently censored by the occupation for being too feudalistic, and was thus not released until after the occupation ended.

Accompanying the censorship of books, newspapers, films, and even paintings which contained unfavorable material about the bombs were a plethora of constructed narratives which, depending on the source, directed blame on one party and victimhood on the other. At times, the most successful narratives of the war in terms of carrying out a compliant occupation were ones which did not mention the bombs at all. Many Japanese (and the U.S. government) were happy to put the trauma of the bombs behind them, and to ostracize those victims that reminded them of the violent past. Yet because of the visual destruction the bombs caused, and the international attention their use attracted, the occupation authorities developed narratives of the war's cataclysmic end which justified the use of the bomb.

Perhaps the most prevalent narrative circulating was the bombs' dropping as a response to the "sneak attack" on Pearl Harbor. The idea that Hiroshima and Nagasaki

were righteous acts of vengeance was summed up in a radio address given by Truman on August 9, 1945, the day of the second dropping:

most fervently nationalistic in the world. The Japanese people's identity was based largely on their purported uniqueness compared to others and their relation, as "children," to the divine emperor. Because of this identity, the Japanese had fought the war with added gusto, which was reflected by unprecedented acts of self-sacrifice and egregious violence. For this reason, losing the war and being subsequently occupied by the United States came at a great emotional and psychological cost. However, Japanese nationalism was still evident despite the thoroughness of the occupation. In MacArthur's Children, a 1984 film about the occupation, one elementary school teacher lectures her students: "Our souls are not under occupation." The extent to which the

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