

ever had its power and scope. For the first time, tens of thousands of women were entering the public sphere as agitators and reformers with a distinctly female agenda. Because this mass influx of reform-minded women into the public sphere was so unprecedented, WCTU leaders were presented with the difficult task of creating a women's national reform culture literally from scratch. Difficult because, as the early suffrage battles indicated, the membership was as varied as it was large. Many WCTU chapters—especially those in small towns and those in the South—were narrowly focused gospel temperance societies. Using moral suasion (e.g., affecting change through religion and education rather than through politics), these chapters concentrated on ending the sale and manufacture of alcohol at the local level. But other WCTUs—especially those in the North and in urban areas—were highly politicized organizations committed to wide-spread societal reform. WCTU leaders needed to build a national organization that made space for both these extremes.

Between 1874 and 1879, the NWCTU was led by Annie Wittenmyer, an ex-Civil War nurse and a staunch anti-suffragist. During her presidency, WCTU women were encouraged to hold prayer meetings, organize and educate children about the dangers of alcohol, circulate temperance pledges, do “home missionary” work among the poor and supposedly intemperate, and make their own homes more attractive in order to counteract the lure of the saloon.¹ Although Wittenmyer voiced the belief that “the world will halt or move in its onward march towards millennial glory, as we[women] halt or march,” she nonetheless cautioned women to be “thoughtful and prayerful” as public agitators and

¹ “Plan of Work” Minutes of the First Annual Convention of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union H nt7esente of, mheatentperC of18, m ofa

to “walk softly before the Lord.”² Under her leadership, WCTU women were discouraged from straying very far from the accepted women’s sphere of home, religion, and children.

But even in these early years, there were WCTUs engaging in activities that tested the boundaries of temperance women’s activism and suggested the need for a leadership more dynamic than Wittenmyer’s. Although by the end of the century, an impressive array of women’s clubs and organizations had sprung up across the country, in the 1870s, the WCTU was often the only game in town, particularly in the mid and far West. Consequently, the organization was drawing to it talented, educated women with little patience for cautious leadership or “walking softly.” The Portland, Maine WCTU, for example, set up a home for “fallen women.”³ In Cleveland, Ohio, the WCTU founded a “woman’s church,” run by seven “deaconesses” and “no pastor, save the shepardess, who may be delegated by the Union.”⁴ While pastors from other churches were welcome in the woman’s church, “the sermons are within the ‘Woman’s Kingdom.’”⁵ Willard and the Illinois WCTU, meanwhile, embarked on their massive petition drive for suffrage.

Of all these activities, none made a bigger stir within the WCTU than the Illinois suffrage campaign. In the late 1870s, Americans still viewed woman suffrage as a dangerous and radical reform with the potential to destroy the family and “unsex”

² “President’s Address,” Minutes of the Fourth Annual Convention of the National Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, Held in Chicago, Ill. October 24, 25, 26, and 27, (Chicago: Woman’s Temperance Publishing Association, 1889), 136. Wittenmyer reiterated this position in the closing remarks of her 1879 address. As the delegates “map[ped] out for the year the work of one of the largest societies in the world,” Wittenmyer urged them to “walk softly before the Lord and carefully before the people, lest we mar God’s work and cross His plans, and mark out paths that our co-laborers cannot enter.” “President’s Address,” Minutes of the Woman’s National Christian Temperance Union, at the Sixth Annual Meeting, in Indianapolis, October 29 to November 3, 1879. (Cleveland: Fairbanks & Co., Printers, 1879), 18.

³ “Corresponding Secretary’s Report” NWCTU Convention, 1877, 182.

⁴ “Corresponding Secretary’s Report” NWCTU Convention, 1877, 190.

⁵ “Corresponding Secretary’s Report” NWCTU Convention, 1877, 191.

By late fall, 1879, WCTU women were ready to give Willard's innovative leadership a try. With a vote of 99 to 40, delegates at the NWCTU convention chose Willard over Wittenmyer as their new national president. And, in annual landslide elections, they would continue to choose her for the next eighteen years.

From the beginning of her presidency, Willard worked toward three important goals: One, making the WCTU a truly national organization, with chapters in every state and territory in the United States (by the mid-1880s, this goal had become an international one); two, building support within the WCTU for suffrage; and three, committing the WCTU to the Prohibition party, a fledgling third party that endorsed both prohibition and woman suffrage. None of these goals would be easy to achieve. The WCTU was a virtual non-entity in the South in 1879. And a northern organization that encouraged women towards public speaking and political agitation could hardly expect a warm reception from a culture that considered "Yankee" a coarse epithet and regarded outspoken public women as aberrations. Even in the North, suggesting that "respectable" middle-class women become suffragists and political partisans was apt to meet with derision and harsh criticism. But Willard was determined that political partisanship and enfranchisement would be central to the WCTU agenda.

Perhaps the single most important thing Willard did as president was decentralize the NWCTU's power structure. Under her leadership, the only requirements to maintaining a membership in the NWCTU, as Willard was fond of saying, were payment of dues and the signing of a temperance pledge. Other than that, WCTU women were given considerable freedom to shape their state and local WCTUs as they saw fit. The NWCTU did have extensive departments of work that it expected would guide the work

of its auxiliaries, but it did not require them to mimic the national plan of work exactly. This decentralized power structure was important for two main reasons: One, it made the WCTU a highly adaptable organization; North and South, East and West, urban and rural, among immigrants, southern black women, and middle-class, native born white women, unions flourished and grew. Two, it allowed the NWCTU to take bold stands on such issues as political partisanship, labor rights, and suffrage with minimal risk of alienating its auxiliaries. If at any time members expressed apprehension over the National's activities, they would quickly be reminded that the NWCTU spoke only for itself on controversial issues, not for the various state and local unions.

The ideological distance the national union maintained from its auxiliaries was especially important when Willard began to push for NWCTU endorsement of the Prohibition party. In the Gilded Age United States, party politics was an unqualified masculine institution. In large part, the genderization of politics occurred for practical reasons: as disfranchised citizens, women were necessarily outsiders to the political process. But there were other reasons why politics was viewed as an exclusively masculine province. By the 1870s, corruption and spoils were common features of partisan politics, remarkable only in their most egregious form (e.g. the scandals of the Grant administration, or the flagrant patronage of urban political machines). Many Americans simply accepted that party politics were, by their nature, a rough-and-tumble world of compromise and shady morality. As such, partisanship was considered altogether unsuitable for women, who, according to Victorian gender conventions, were naturally moral, religious, and pure.

But Willard did not accept that party politics were intrinsically unprincipled or immoral, although she was unstinting in her criticism of the two mainstream parties. The Republican party was “degenerate”; the Democratic party was an “anathema maranatha”⁶; both were hopelessly corrupt and controlled by “that Cerberus of perdition, the saloon.”⁷ But the Prohibition party, Willard argued, opposed the liquor industry and its questionable lobbying practices. It opposed “the practical surrender of the souls and bodies of children to the saloon-keeper in return for their votes.” It fought to bring true democracy to America by advocating the full enfranchisement of women. And in doing all this, Willard declared, it became the true embodiment of political party: “the mould into which God pours the principles that are to bless humanity.”⁸ Thus, in Willard’s construction, partisan wrangling for constituents and elective offices became an epic battle between the servants of Cerberus and the mould of God for the preservation of democracy and the home.

By infusing partisan politics with the grandeur of a holy crusade, Willard could then easily argue that partisanship—in the form of endorsing the Prohibition party—was every woman’s Christian duty. And when the Illinois WCTU endorsed the Prohibition party in 1881, Willard declared that they were filled with “the power of the Highest manifest,” and she challenged all WCTU women to “falter who must, follow who dare!”⁹

Taken as a whole, Willard’s arguments were a bold re-visioning of women’s political power. When Willard began her campaign for the Prohibition party, it was a

⁶ “President’s Annual Address,” Minutes of the National Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, At the Twelfth Annual Meeting In Philadelphia, PA., Octoberth 30st and Novembernd 2nd and 3^d. (Brooklyn:

Prohibition party. That year, Willard introduced the “Great Petition campaign,” which, over the course of the following year, would help build support for the Prohibition party within the WCTU.

As Willard initially conceived the campaign, the NWCTU would print up and distribute to all the state unions petitions for a national prohibition amendment. This “plea for Home, Sweet Home” would be circulated throughout the states for signatures by

“Fresh from [the] triumphs in the Greenback convention,” the petitioners next traveled to the Republican national convention. The writer of this report, probably not Willard, was only identified as “One Who Was There.” She described how the delegates grudgingly accepted the petition (an attempt to refer it to committee without reading was ultimately unsuccessful), but that they did vote to extend to Willard fifteen minutes rather than five to address the convention. In the course of her remarks, which the *Union Signal* printed in full, Willard cautioned her audience that “some political party will respond to this plea from the hearts of women,” and it will be this party for which women will “pray and work, circulate literature, convene assemblies, and do all in our power to secure its success.”¹²

“And now what was the result” of the Republican convention? asked the *Union Signal* corres

seemed to voice the sentiments of the whole convention when he declared that his state “always follows...St. John and Willard....We know our leaders.”¹⁷

“Oh! wasn’t it all jolly and glorious,” wrote one especially enthusiastic WCTU member to the *Union Signal* about the Prohibition party convention,

and wasn’t Miss Willard grand, and weren’t you all just as proud of her as proud could be? Oh! I am so glad I am a woman, and I thank God that woman’s citizenship and the triumph of the temperance cause are going to come, hand in hand, and that we have not many more years to wait.¹⁸

Enthusiasm for the Prohibition party was still riding high six weeks later when the delegates at the 1884 NWCTU convention in St. Louis passed a far more assertive and uncompromising resolution for partisanship than they ever had before. After taking considerable pains to emphasize the NWCTU’s continued commitment to evangelicalism and moral suasion and to stress that “our action as a National society is not binding upon States or individuals,” the NWCTU declared that

as we now know which national party gives us the desired embodiment of the principles for which our ten years’ labor has been expended, we will continue to lend our influence to the national political organization which declares in its platform for National Prohibition and Home Protection.¹⁹

Though the name “Prohibition party” does not appear in the resolution, the references to national prohibition and home protection in the “St. Louis resolution” disqualified all but that particular party as contenders for the NWCTU’s support.

But the unrelent

first half of the 1880s. These laws required all public schools in the state to include in their curriculums instruction on the effects of alcohol on the human body. Vermont enacted the first scientific temperance law in 1882, and over the next three years, nine other states, Washington DC, and the Dakota Territory all followed suit.²³ In every case, WCTU women were the most vocal and active campaigners for scientific temperance instruction, and they rightfully cla(1)-2(l)ta(1)l4(D)2(h,)-2(f5.((ai)-6(l)-12(e)-6(g)h,)i)-2(s)-1(l)-2(a)4(t)-2(i)-

WCTU-

prohibitory amendment to “great frauds” in the tallying process and the governor’s refusal to issue a recount.²⁸

Though the failure of a protracted and expensive campaign had an immediate, demoralizing effect on the WCTU women involved, it often also contributed to an increased interest in suffrage or third party politics, or both. In the aftermath of its failed campaign for a scientific temperance instruction bill, for example, the Indiana WCTU claimed that “stand[ing] before courteous school boards and plead[ing]” for the enactment of a scientific temperance instruction law was a “stern educator for the women of Indiana.” As “courteous” school officials declined their request, WCTU women “longed to be able to answer their smiles with votes that would retain or displace them.” And after witnessing the debacle in the Illinois legislature, the state WCTU president overcame her reservations toward suffrage and “labored heartily for Home Protection.”²⁹

As the accomplishments of WCTU women multiplied, legislators’ and other elected officials’ refusal to solidify their reforms in law became increasingly objectionable. Often explicitly voicing their dissatisfaction with the two mainstream parties, particularly the Republicans, and their elected representatives, growing numbers of state and local unions began passing resolutions of support for both suffrage and the Prohibitionists.³⁰ The 1884 Missouri convention was exceptionally emphatic in its support of the two measures as well as its condemnation of the Republican party. Noting that the party’s platform “entirely ignored” not only prohibition, but also woman suffrage, “an omission which, in our government, impairs its strength, depriving it of the

element of justice,” convention delegates resolved to “protest against this so-called party of progress and...endorse that party that shall better represent the advanced sentiment of the nation.”³¹ The Arizona territory convention also passed a strongly worded resolution for suffrage, stating that

it is the sentiment of this body that the exclusion of woman from the possession and exercise of her natural rights, has been calamitous to the whole human race, inflicting great injury, upon both sons and daughters, cultivating in man a love of domination, and in woman an unwomanly dependence, and farther, that the votes of woman are imperatively needed to promote temperance, purity and peace, to give woman greater self-reliance, self-respect, and personal independence, and to secure her ‘a fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work,’—also that in the progress and development of civilization new duties and responsibilities have been thrust upon us, therefore it is the duty of all intelligent women to accept a full recognition of equal civil and political rights.³²

Most unions similarly pointed to what they saw as the failure of male voters and political parties to uphold the nation’s moral standards and protect the home when justifying their more political, women’s rights approach to temperance reform.

By 1884, less than ten years after Annie Wittenmyer had advocated caution and restraint as the guiding principles of the NWCTU, temperance women across the country

party's influence peaked in 1884, and by 1892 it was once again of negligible political importance), the WCTU nevertheless helped shape a distinct political sphere for women. And the extensive amount of "moral" legislation that WCTU women successfully agitated for at the state and local levels, such as prohibition, blue laws, age of consent, school suffrage for women, and scientific temperance education in public schools is evidence of how strong that culture was.

³² "News From the Field: Arizona" *Union Signal* January 10 1884, 11.

Jean Paul Marat: Target and Martyr of Liberty

By Yvonne Cupp

The French Revolution produced countless influential politicians throughout its tumultuous course. As a political figure in the French Revolution, Jean Paul Marat began as a nonentity and became a martyr to the revolutionary patriots of France. His influence is often misconstrued, and sometimes overlooked. Although he was not a political leader like Robespierre, his influence was substantial in that he motivated many people through his writing and powerful personality. Through his involvement with the Cordeliers' Club and his journal *Ami du peuple* started September 1789, Marat was able to express the indignation of the bourgeois class through his hopes for social revolution. His conspir

hiding to evade the law. Targeting Marat was an easy and effective way for the w in the National Convention to assert their political dominance. It is curious how a unknown and newcomer to government could become so crucial to the politics of Revolution, only to be murdered by another unknown in a seemingly isolated e476 assassination played a great part in what became the cycle of the Terror. Even th a preeminent leader, both his life and death had an impact on the course of the R Because of his incendiary political beliefs and bold nature, the government targeted however, his assassination by the outsider Charlotte Corday primarily an unrelated motivated more so by personal convictions than politics.

Jean Paul Marat's early personal life had an effect on his later political car Boudry, Neuchatel on 24 May 1743 to a family of mixed race, Jean Parat had a pa

and tenacious temperament that would serve him throughout his professional life.

politician. His contro

counterrevolution, which he greatly feared for the sake of the people.²¹ Marat once said, "To remain free one must be perpetually on guard against those that govern."²² Influential

each side tried to discredit the other by denouncing its respective deputies. Since Marat always considered himself an outsider, his convergence with the Montagnards was more strategic in promoting his own career than based on common political ground.²⁷ Because of the risk involved in associating with a radical, it was difficult for Marat to obtain full support from even those revolutionaries who shared his beliefs. Marat's growing popularity provoked the Girondins to continue monitoring him as the monarchical government had before, forcing him to move in and out of seclusion to evade arrest.²⁸ The Girondins promoted the evil reputation of Marat in order to discredit preeminent Montagnards through their association with him, including Robespierre and Danton. Although intended to be harmful, in many ways these attacks enhanced Marat's reputation as a political martyr.

Additionally, the Girondins blamed undesirable events of the Revolution on Marat. The controversy over the September Massacres of 1792 widened the rift between the Girondins and Marat because they blamed him for the tragedy because of his radical promotion for a dictatorship.²⁹ Marat's responsibility for the Massacres is unlikely because he did not have enough political influence at the time to organize such an event. He had just been elected to the Committee of Surveillance when the Massacres started on September 12.³⁰ This does not mean however, that he had no influence whatsoever behind the scenes or through his writing.

Marat did not sit idly by and allow himself to be denounced, rather he used this factional conflict to the Montagnards (and his own) advantage. In order to depict the Montagnards and himself as defenders of the people, he portrayed the Girondins as oppressors of true revolutionary spirit and royalist sympathizers for their opposition to the revolutionary policies.³¹ He also toned down his radical rhetoric in order to quell Girondins opposition they could be purged them from the Convention. In this Marat was also instrumental. After the attempt to impeach Marat from

²⁷ Conner, 226.

²⁸ Conner, 164.

²⁹ Conner, 90.

³⁰ Ibid., 219.

³¹ Sydenham Girondins 157.

the Convention resulted in his acquittal by the Revolutionary Tribunal in what became known as the “Triumph of Marat”, the Gironde was virtually defeated. The extent of popular support for Marat was demonstrated when the public rejoiced at his acquittal.³² The final blow would come with Marat’s influence in the events from May-31 June 2, 1793 in which the sans culottes and Parisian National Guard surrounded the Convention and purged the Gironde.

Marat’s political influence during this time expanded with his seat in the Convention, but paled in comparison to preeminent leaders such as Robespierre or Danton. Although Marat was influential through his ideas and writings, he did not have a political agenda or enact many legislative reforms. Marat focused on ideas and left the specifics to fate, or whoever wished to take on the task. He was often absent from the political scene because he went ‘underground’ to avoid police, and ‘retired’ when he got discouraged with the Revolution’s progress. Michael Walzer writes that Marat was the center of controversy, but not an influential deputy in the Convention.³³ This would lead one to believe that he was an ineffective politician overall. Other than his writing, Marat did not have much influence in early revolutionary events, such as the storming of the Bastille in 1789.³⁴ Although he insisted on his role in the October Days, there was not much evidence to prove his presence at the insurrection.³⁵ This may lead one to question why a figure with modest political influence would be targeted for assassination.

Because of his radical ideas, Marat’s influence extended beyond the National Convention floor, whether or not he had ultimate power within it. Marat was able to affect the popular consciousness through his *Ami du peuple* and his proclamation in being the defender of the people. Montagnard support allowed Marat to align sans culottes with the Jacobins in the National Convention, and extend his influence in both.³⁶ This also had the effect of creating

³² Conner, 246.

³³ Walzer, 158.

³⁴ Conner, 154.

³⁵ Gottschalk, 58.

³⁶ Conner, 226.

several important Girondins. They were able to excuse the Terror by arguing that the assassination was a plot by counter-revolutionaries.⁴² Charlotte Corday had unwittingly assisted Robespierre in his rise to preeminence by ridding the Jacobins of ~~Marat~~⁴³ because of his violent

between the revolutionary factions. In order to discredit the Mountain, the Girondins promoted the evil reputation of Marat. He became a scapegoat for political problems in their attempts to denounce the Montagnards. In his defense, Marat used this conflict and the attacks upon him to portray the Girondins as repressive to revolutionary spirit. The nature of Marat's influence in the French Revolution increased with time but remained generally more modest than other revolutionary leaders. He was most influential as a writer and philosopher, not as a politician. Marat was influential because he stood out amongst other revolutionaries and the public, and remained steadfast in his convi

State Violence and Black Resistance during World War I and the 1920s

By Shannon King

The fact that there is little or no gang labor gives Harlem Negroes the opportunity for expansion and individual contacts with the life and spirit of New York. A thousand Negroes from Mississippi put to work as a gang in a Pittsburgh steel mill will for a long time remain a thousand Negroes from Mississippi. Under the conditions that prevail in New York they would be all within six months become New Yorkers. The rapidity with which Negroes become good New Yorkers is one of the marvels to observers . . . One of the principal factors in the race riot in Chicago in 1919 was the fact that at that time there were 12,000 Negroes employed in gangs in the stockyards. There was considerable race feeling in Harlem at the time of the hegira of white residents due to the "invasion," but the feeling of course, is no more.

James Weldon Johnson, "The Making of Harlem"

In 1925 when James Weldon Johnson published "The Making of Harlem," Harlem had yet to experience a race riot comparable to those in East St. Louis, Chicago, and Tulsa. According to Johnson, there were no race riots in Harlem because, "Employment of Negroes in New York is diversified." Blacks in Harlem, therefore no longer remained "merely 'Harlem Negroes'; astonishingly soon they become New Yorkers." Johnson's history of Harlem misrepresents and mischaracterizes the history of race relations and violence in United States history. He suggests that blacks' increased presence caused a disruption in social relations. Once they assimilated, he assumed, interracial violence would cease. In Harlem, and throughout black Manhattan, interracial violence arose on a daily basis, though not at the magnitude of race riots in other municipalities.³ Civil societal and state violence was a constant threat, for racial tensions between blacks and whites persisted.

In August 1900, the Tenderloin district was the site of a race riot that set the tone for the relationships among blacks, whites, and the police for most of the twentieth century. On August 12th, on Forty First Street and Eighth Avenue, police officer Robert J. Thorpe in civilian clothes attempted to arrest a black woman, who he thought was "soliciting."th, on F

th (the day of Thorpe's funeral) the police and white gangs wreaked havoc on black neighborhoods throughout the Tenderloin. Black pedestrians from 34th street to 42nd street along Broadway, Seventh, and Eighth Avenues were attacked. "They [police] ran with the

threw them to the rioters, and in many cases they beat and clubbed men and women more brutally than the mob did.⁶ In retaliation, blacks armed themselves, while the black elite formed the "The Citizens' Protective League." Although the CPL persistently solicited the protection

violence was often semipublic, not part of the “public transcript” although it took place in public spaces and was known throughout the black community.¹⁰ The semipublic character of state violence and surveillance was perpetuated in tandem with overt or “public” acts of violence. As historian Joe W. Trotter Jr. aptly states, “African Americans were both overpoliced and underprotected in their lives and property.¹¹ For black New Yorkers, then, the police was an “army of occupation” rather than bearers of “law and order.”¹²

The accumulation of insults, harassment, searches, and seizures induced blacks to arm themselves for self-defense and sometimes, violently attack the police. In Harlem, these bouts with the police, and the distrust that ensued, translated into public articulations of antiracism and self-preservation that were reflected in New Negro radicalism during and after the World War I; these conditions raised Harlem’s racial consciousness, persuading Harlemites to defend themselves as well as other blacks in their environs, so that an attack on one denizen was an attack on the entire community. Harlem developed a political culture in infrapolitics—reflected in their daily acts of resistance that had been cultivated earlier in the century throughout black Manhattan.¹³ The essay contends that the persistence of violence throughout black Manhattan perpetuated by white civilians and reinforced by the police mobilized and politicized blacks, individually and collectively, to defend their own race.

“Hoodlums in and out of police uniforms”

The Great War caused a dramatic demographic shift in Harlem, as in other northern cities. Since the turn of the century, US Southern and Caribbean migrants traveled to Harlem seeking better living conditions, as blacks moved northward from other neighborhoods in black Manhattan. Although the WWI had not begun, Harlem’s black population outpaced the rest of black Manhattan. By 1911, according to the New York Urban League, “San Juan Hill, or Columbus Hill, has become a less desirable district in which to live, while the Negro population has doubled in itself many times in Harlem.¹⁴ Between 1910 and 1920, black Manhattan expanded from 60,534 to 109,133, increasing 80.3 per cent.¹⁵ WWI intensified the migration process, facilitating Harlem’s transformation from a white to a black neighborhood. By 1930, there were 224,670 in black Manhattan, an increase of 105.9 per cent.¹⁶

Although W.E. B. Dubois’ call for African Americans to volunteer for the war in the spring of 1917 was met with skepticism, many blacks enlisted in the military to demonstrate their loyalty to the US; it was argued that service in the military during the US’ war for democracy could be used as a weapon to claim their rights. In Harlem, Adam Clayton Powell, Sr., pastor of the Abyssinian Baptist Church told his congregation:

¹⁰ Robin D.G. Kelley, *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class* (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 85.

¹¹ Joe W. Trotter, Jr. *Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915-1945* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 118.

¹² Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 85.

¹³ Infrapolitics is understood as social and cultural practices that are associated with oppressed classes geared towards covertly changing the power relationships through “hidden transcripts,” a dissident political culture, and daily acts of resistance and survival. Robin D.G. Kelley, *Race Rebels*. In Harlem, and throughout black Manhattan, both state repression and black resistance were “infra” in the sense that they were not documented in the “official” or “public” transcript, which criminalized black self-defense.

¹⁴ *Twenty-Four Negro Families in Harlem* (New York: The New York Urban League, May 1927), 3.

¹⁵ Fourteenth Census of The United States: 1920. IV. General Report and Analytical Tables, Chapter I. Table 16., 55.

¹⁶ Fifteenth Census of The United States: 1930. Population, Vol. II General Report Statistics by Subjects, Chapter II, Table 24., 76.

This is the proper time for us to make a special request for our constitutional rights as American citizens. The ten million colored people in this country were ~~severely~~ ^{severely} needed as now...As a race we ought to let our government know that if it wants us to fight foreign powers we must be given some assurance first of better treatment at home...Why should not the colored Americans make a bloodless demand at this time for the rights we have been making futile efforts to secure [from a] government that has persistently stood by with folded arms while we were oppressed and murdered?

While Powell encouraged participation in the war, his tone was evident of blacks' ~~waiting~~ ^{waiting} in the US. Harlemites, nevertheless, responded by selling Liberty bonds and marching in parades, confirming their loyalty and demonstrating their pride as representative citizens. "Many Harlemites could not have been more prouder that their community ~~had~~ ^{had} been chosen as the base for the first black military unit ever recognized in New York Stat (t-4(t)8436(v)2(e)(as)-T</MCID 14 >>

saloon, and he was attacked by a group of blacks and thrown out. Police officer Mirzio rescued Gollote until reserves arrived in response to the blown whistle.²¹

Simultaneously, between SixtySecond and SixtyThird and Amsterdam Avenue, blacks and whites brawled, using revolvers, bricks, rocks, and razors in the streets. The police attempted to clear the streets, but they were unsuccessful until reserves arrived from several police stations. Home Defense Guards and white "volunteers" also assisted the police. The police officers were unsuccessful with their batons, so they used their revolvers, according to the Times. The fighting continued to spread down SixtySecond and SixtyThird and West End. Eventually, the police cleared the streets, although the fighting continued in surrounding environs, within stores, barber shops, saloons and tenements.⁴

Although officer Hansen neither respected Joaquin's uniform nor his civil rights, the July 3rd conflict evinces more than a police officer's unlawful behavior. The riot highlights the intense racial animosity among blacks, whites, and the police that were intensified by police brutality and unwarranted searches and arrests. In this case, as well as the brawl of May 26th at San Juan Hill, white "volunteers" joined the police to repress blacks, demonstrating a racial bond between the police force and the white civilians. The riot also sheds light on the contradictions of WWI black patriotism and race riots. Black patriotism prevailed because the community believed race relations would improve after the war. The soldiers of the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment came from the San Juan Hill district, but the majority was from Harlem.³⁵ The violence within and outside of Harlem must have been unsettling. Black soldiers serving in the war abroad were segregated and discriminated against; while throughout the US, whites terrorized blacks in the North and the South. Finally, and perhaps most emblematic of the contradictions during the

blacks to fight their wars. Blacks were primarily used as pawns. Garvey arJ -0.004 v20(y)s -4(ei)-6(ra)-

Harlem believed that the police had brutalized another of their denizens. As the editor of the *Amsterdam News* wrote, "Three thousand people can't be wrong." White and black police officers served the community with "brutality not brains." The court case endured for seven months. Clarence Donald, who was at the center of the riot, was convicted for felonious assault on an officer. Several witnesses, testifying in Donald's behalf, would also serve time.

The conflict began in Mr. Henry and Zerlena Chavis', a black couple, apartment at 559 Lenox Avenue. Mrs. Chavis said that at seven in the evening, three drunken men knocked on her apartment door asking for Robert. Mrs. Chavis testified that she closed her door and awoke her husband, who went to the kitchen door and let the three men into the apartment. She left the apartment and ascended the stairs, allegedly followed by Clarence Donald. Donald choked her and she screamed, testified Mrs. Chavis. Ruth Jackson, a tenant on the fifth floor, heard the scream and brought Mrs. Chavis into the apartment. Jackson identified Donald as the aggressor. Mrs. Chavis then screamed out the window, yelling, "Catch that man."

The actual riot began in the street with the beating of Clarence Donald. There were several versions of the altercation; yet all stated Clarence Donald battled with several police officers. The *New York Times* and the *New York Amsterdam News* named Officer James Kubeil as the first officer to arrive. After this, the stories diverge. The *Times* the police officers' testimonies' both state that Donald initiated the conflict and that the black community defended him. Donald kicked Officer Kubeil in the privates when the officer tried to grab him and "several negroes standing near by joined in the affray," according to the *Times*. The *Amsterdam News* however, states that Donald was attacked first and that the riot began as a result of Officer Destella striking a black woman when she told him that he should be ashamed for beating a defenseless man.⁵²

While in custody the police assaulted Donald, according to the *Amsterdam News*. Donald was taken to the police station he was walking, but they brought him out on a stretcher.⁵³ Dermot Bailey, who was also arrested at the riot on a charge of disorderly conduct and later released, told a reporter that he saw four plain clothed men and one uniformed police officer beat Donald behind closed doors at the West 135th Street police station.⁵⁴ Donald claimed

